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Abstract
The climate-trade nexus gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts
to forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. This raises the
issues of the scope of trade-related measures and of when and how they could be used.
This paper discusses how far trade-related measures should be incorporated in that
context. Drawing on an analogy to the Montreal Protocol and comparing developing
country’s climate mitigation and adaptation needs with the funding available, the paper
argues that such measures should initially be applied only among Annex I or II countries.
To discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level, the paper
emphasizes a need to define comparable climate efforts. Moreover, the LiebermanWarner bill in the U.S. Senate - taken as a proxy for future U.S. climate legislation - is
assessed, and found to be neither effective nor likely to be WTO-consistent. The paper is
concluded by arguing that, in order to encourage developing countries to do more to
combat climate change, developed countries should focus on carrots. Sticks can be
incorporated, but only if they are credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement
to push developing countries to take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than
would otherwise have been the case.
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I. Introduction
There is a growing consensus that climate change has the potential to seriously damage
our natural environment and affect the global economy and thus represents the world’s
most pressing long-term threat to future prosperity and security. With greenhouse gas
emissions embodied in virtually all products produced and traded in every conceivable
economic sector, effectively addressing climate change will require a fundamental
transformation of our economy and the ways energy is produced and used. This will
certainly have a bearing on world trade because it will affect the costs of production of
traded products and therefore their competitive positions in the world market. This
climate-trade nexus has become the focus of an academic debate (e.g., Bhagwati and
Mavroidis, 2007; Charnovitz, 2003; Hufbauer, Charnovitz and Kim, 2009; Ismer and
Neuhoff, 2007; The World Bank, 2007; Zhang, 1998, 2004 and 2007a; Zhang and
Assunção, 2004), and gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts to
forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. To level the
carbon playing field, such a regime, if effective, will imperatively include the use of
trade-related policy tools. The core element of that is trade-related measures in a post2012 climate change regime. This raises the issues of the scope of such measures and of
when and how they could be used.
To examine this issue, this paper first looks at the lesson learned from other multinational
environmental agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol in which such trade provisions
have been included to see what guidance can be provided. Next, the paper examines
whether the condition can be met, provided that a post-2012 climate regime is to
incorporate trade provisions as the Montreal Protocol does. The paper also interprets the
findings of the WTO panels on the Thai cigarette dispute the Shrimp-Turtle dispute to
infer future WTO panel’s stance on the use trade provisions being justified under the
environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX. On these basis, the paper argues that
while it is unlikely for developing country parties to agree to the inclusion of traderelated measures in a post-2012 climate regime, trade-related measures should, at the
very least, be contemplated for a set of industrialized countries (Annex I or II countries)
as part of the evolving climate regime. It should be specified how these measures will
apply to non-complying parties within this group and when and how unilateral trade
measures can be used against countries outside the group. To that end, the paper
emphasizes that there is a clear need to define comparable efforts towards climate
mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the
international level, because some industrialized countries, if not all, are considering the
term “comparable” as the standard by which to assess the efforts made by their trading
partners in order to decide on whether to impose unilateral trade measures on them.
Finally, the paper argues that the Lieberman-Warner type of border adjustment provision,
in its current form, is likely to face a WTO-consistency and methodological challenges. It
holds out more sticks than carrots to developing countries. In order to encourage
developing countries to do more to combat climate change, developed countries should
clearly focus on carrots. Although sticks can be incorporated, it is argued that they should
be credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement to push developing countries to
take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than would otherwise have been the
case. The paper concludes that at a time when the world community is starting to
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negotiate a post-2012 climate regime, unrealistic border adjustment measures as
exemplified in the Lieberman-Warner bill are counterproductive to help to reach such an
agreement on comparable climate actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations.

2. Trade measures in the Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (MP) was signed in
1987 and has since been amended and strengthened in a number of aspects. The MP uses
trade measures as one enforcement mechanism among several policy instruments in
achieving its aim of protecting the ozone layer. Parties to the treaty are required to ban
trading with non-parties in ozone-depleting substances (ODS), such as CFCs, in products
containing them, such as refrigerators, and potentially, in products made with but not
containing CFCs, such as electronic components. The last provision has not yet been
implemented primarily because of problems of detection, and also because of the small
volumes of CFCs involved. These trade measures have been gradually extended to all the
categories of ozone-depleting substances covered by the MP. Moreover, the MP has
included the provision that exempts non-parties from trade measures if they are
determined by the parties to be in compliance with the phase-out schedules. So, the
offsetting trade measures are based on legitimate environmental objective and not merely
on formal membership of an international agreement (Brack, 1996; Zhang, 1998).
More importantly, these trade measures are accompanied with finance and technology
transfer mechanisms. Under the MP, the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the
Montreal Protocol was established in 1990 to meet the incremental costs of developing
country parties (the so-called Article 5 countries) in complying with the MP requirements.
Since its operation in 1991, the Multilateral Fund has received contributions totaling over
US$ 2.3 billion from 49 industrialized countries and supported about 5,700 projects and
activities in 146 developing countries. The implementation of these projects will result in
the phase-out of the consumption of more than 249,577 ODP tonnes and the production
of about 174,206 tonnes of ozone depleting substances. As a result, developing countries
are no worse off as parties than they are as non-parties. The MP is now 20-year old with
191 Parties. It has achieved 95% of its objective of phasing out the ODS and put the
ozone layer on a path to recovery.1 Accompanied with this effective financial mechanism,
the first of its kind from an international treaty, the MP trade measures have in fact hardly
ever been used, because almost every country is now a party to the treaty.

3. Funding from the Climate Convention and its financial mechanism
The lesson from the MP suggests that the funding level of finance mechanism is crucial if
a post-2012 climate regime is to incorporate trade provisions as the Montreal Protocol
does. The Kyoto Protocol (KP) establishes a clean development mechanism (CDM). It
serves as a channel to provide finance and technology transfer to developing countries.
The CDM has, in part, been successful. The global number of CDM projects registered
1

See the Multilateral Fund web site at: http://www.multilateralfund.org (accessed on
August 29, 2008).
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and in the pipeline totals over 4600 - well above what was envisioned by countries when
they negotiated, designed and launched the mechanism (Zhang, 2009b). The CDM
market increased from 563 million tons of certified emission reductions (CERs) and €3.9
billion in 2006 to 947 million tons of CERs and €12 billion in 2007. The astonishing
increase in value terms is due mainly to dramatic growth in the secondary market with
about 300 million CERs traded over the course of 2007 (Point Carbon, 2008). While the
CDM has emerged as a financing mechanism to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions as the
implementation of CDM projects has progressed, it still does not work to full potential
scale (IETA, 2008; Paulsson, 2009; Zhang, 2008a). To that end, change needs to take
place both at national and international levels. At the national level, for those developing
countries that have not truly benefited from the CDM, they need to put in place clear
institutional structures, streamlined and transparent CDM procedures and sound
governance of clearer lines of responsibility and functions to facilitate the smooth
implementation of CDM projects in their countries. At the international level, post-Kyoto
climate negotiations need to reform the CDM to overcome its current structural
limitations and to make it accommodate those players and types of small projects that
have been left out to date. When taken together and combined, they will help to expand
the number and geographical reach of the CDM, thus spreading its benefits to more
countries (Zhang, 2008a). Nevertheless, markets cannot deliver miracles. Market
instruments like CDM, as useful as it may be, must therefore be complemented with
traditional fund solutions that provide a stable source of funding.

Table 1 The Amount of Pledges and Contributions from the Multilateral Financial
Mechanisms under the Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol
Sources
Special Climate Change Fund
Least Developed Countries Fund
Adaptation Fund
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
(allocated to climate change focal area)

Amount (million US$)
106.57 (pledged)
172.44 (pledged)
80-300 per year (estimated)
950 (targeted for 2006-2010)

Sources: Global Environment Facility (2008a); UNFCCC (2007).

Can the funds established within the climate regime deliver as the Multilateral Fund
under the MP did? The Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries
Fund are established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). As of October 2, 2008, the total pledged for these two funds
(cumulatively, not per year) is US$279 million (Table 1). The only fund under the KP is
the Adaptation Fund. The level of its funding depends on the quantity of CERs issued and
their prices. Assuming annual sales of 300-450 million tons of CERs and a market price
of US$24 per ton of CERs, the Adaptation Fund would receive US$80-300 million per
year for the period 2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 2007). The Global Environment Facility
(GEF) as an entity operating the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC has targeted the
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amount of US$950 from its fourth replenishment at climate change projects over the
period 2006-2010. Combined together, the pledges and contributions from all these three
funds and the GEF Trust Fund are well below US$1 billion a year.
By contrast, according to the Stern Review (Stern, 2007), the incremental costs of low
carbon investments in developing countries are likely to be at least US$20-30 billion a
year. This is a very conservative estimate. The UNFCCC (2007) Secretariat puts the
investment estimates for climate change adaptation in developing countries in the range
of US$28-67 billion a year. On mitigation, the UNFCCC (2007) Secretariat estimates the
investment of US$76 billion needed in developing countries a year.2 So, developing
countries will need the investment of at least US$100 billion in climate change mitigation
and adaptation. However, the contributions from all these three funds and the GEF Trust
Fund only amount to less than one percent of the anticipated needs from developing
countries. This suggests that the ratio of the combined pledged funding from the funds to
the required investment at 1:100.

Table 2 GEF Trust Fund Allocations and Co-financing in the Climate Change
Focal Area
GEF Phase
Pilot phase (1991-1994)
GEF 1 (1994-1998)
GEF 2 (1998-2002)
GEF 3 (2002-2006)
GEF 4 (2006-2010)
2007
2008
2009
Total

GEF Grant
(million US$)
284.80
510.36
681.07
877.72
950.00 (targeted)
76.35
138.45
88.26
2657.01

Co-financing
(million US$
2402.89
2322.10
3403.40
4810.56
1651.82
1119.46
514.04
16224.28

Source: Global Environment Facility (2008b).

The value of a single multilateral fund lies in its ability to leverage contributions from a
range of other donors. Can these funds leverage co-financing from other sources to close
this financing gap? Let us look at the recent record of leverage of multilateral funding.
Since 1990, the World Bank Group commitments to renewable energy and efficiency
have exceeded US$10 billion, with each dollar leveraging another three dollars from
other private and public sources (Cundy, 2006). The GEF as an entity operating the
financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, since its inception in 1991, has provided $8.26
2

The estimates vary. The World Bank (2006) estimates the incremental, upfront capital
costs of US$30 billion per year to decarbonize the power sector in developing countries
alone.
5
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billion in grants and generated over $33.7 billion in co-financing from other sources to
support over 2,200 projects that produce global environmental benefits in 165 developing
countries and countries with economies in transition.3 As indicated in Table 2, in the
focal area of climate change, as at November 2008, the GEF has allocated since its
inception a total of US$2.66 billion from the GEF Trust Fund. This GEF funding has
leveraged a co-financing in excess of US$16.22 billion. This suggests that the GEF
enjoys an average leverage ratio of 4.1 in the all six focal areas and 6.1 in the climate
change focal area, meaning that each dollar of the GEF grant leverages US$4.1-6.1 from
other sources. Assuming the leverage ratio of 6 and the minimum requirement of US$100
billion per year, then the current commitments are only able to bring the total finance
value to US$7 billion and leave the financing gap of US$93 billion per year. To close this
gap, we need to increase the multilateral funding and enhance its leverage ability.
Assuming the leverage ratio of 10, which has not experienced over the long time horizon
for multibillion public funding, and the minimum requirement of US$100 billion per year,
then the multilateral funding needs to be increased to US$10 billion per year to meet
developing country needs for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
If the funding available under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC remains at its
current level and continues to rely mainly on voluntary contributions, it will not be
sufficient to address the future financial flows estimated to be needed for climate change
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. If a success of the Montreal Protocol
could be considered as some kind of predictor for a post-2012 climate regime, the
combined pledged funding and contribution from the funds under the UNFCCC and the
GEF and estimated funding from the fund under its KP are nowhere near to make trade
measures work effectively, not to mention whether they can be incorporated in a post2012 climate regime in the first place.

4. The findings of WTO Thai cigarette dispute and the Shrimp-Turtle dispute
Before the contracting parties resort to trade measures to fulfill health/environmental
concerns, WTO case laws suggest that, in order for these measures to be justified under
the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX, the contracting parties should
explore whether there are any alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably
expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the
relevant WTO provisions or a good-faith effort has been made to reach an agreement
among the parties concerned.
The GATT Thai cigarette dispute illustrates the former. Under Section 27 of the Tobacco
Act of 1966, Thailand restricted imports of cigarettes and imposed a higher tax rate on
imported cigarettes when they were allowed on the three occasions since 1966, namely in
1968-70, 1976 and 1980. After consultations with Thailand failed to lead to a solution,
the U.S. requested in 1990 the Dispute Settlement Panel to rule on the Thai action on the
grounds that it was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the General Agreement; was not
3

See “The About GEF” at the GEF web site at:
http://www.thegef.org/interior.aspx?id=50 (accessed on November 14, 2008).
6
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justified by the exception under Article XI:2(c), because cigarettes were not an
agricultural or fisheries product in the meaning of Article XI:1; and was not justified
under Article XX(b) because the restrictions were not necessary to protect human health,
i.e. controlling the consumption of cigarettes did not require an import ban. The Dispute
Settlement Panel ruled against Thailand. The Panel found that Thailand had acted
inconsistently with Article XI:1 for having not granted import licenses over a long period
of time. Recognizing that XI:2(c) allows exceptions for fisheries and agricultural
products if the restrictions are necessary to enable governments to protect farmers and
fishermen who, because of the perishability of their produce, often could not withhold
excess supplies of the fresh product from the market, the Panel found that cigarettes were
not “like” the fresh product as leaf tobacco and thus were not among the products eligible
for import restrictions under Article XI:2(c). Moreover, the Panel acknowledged that
Article XX(b) allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade
liberalization. The Panel held the view that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand
could be considered to be “necessary” in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no
alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it,
which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy
objectives. However, the Panel found the Thai import restriction measure not necessary
because Thailand could reasonably be expected to take strict, non-discriminatory
labelling and ingredient disclosure regulations and to ban all the direct and indirect
advertising, promotion and sponsorship of cigarettes to ensure the quality and reduce the
quantity of cigarettes sold in Thailand. These alternative measures are considered WTOconsistent to achieve the same health policy objectives as Thailand now pursues through
an import ban on all cigarettes whatever their ingredients (GATT, 1990).
The WTO Appellate Body decisions on the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, which have been
interpreted as implicitly permitting trade measures pursued through multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs), illustrate the latter. To address the decline of sea
turtles around the world, in 1989 the U.S. Congress enacted Section 609 of Public Law
101-162 to authorize embargoes on shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology
harmful to sea turtles. The U.S. was challenged in the WTO by India, Malaysia, Pakistan
and Thailand in October 1996, after embargoes were leveled against them. The four
governments challenged this measure, asserting that the U.S. could not apply its laws to
foreign process and production methods. A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel was
established in April 1997 to hear the case. The Panel found that the U.S. failed to
approach the complainant nations in serious multilateral negotiations before enforcing the
U.S. law against those nations. The Panel held that the U.S. shrimp embargo was a class
of measures of processes-and-production-methods type and had a serious threat to the
multilateral trading system because it conditioned market access on the conservation
policies of foreign countries. Thus, it cannot be justified under GATT Article XX.
However, the WTO Appellate Body overruled the Panel’s reasoning. The Appellate Body
held that a WTO member requires from exporting countries compliance, or adoption of,
certain policies prescribed by the importing country does not render the measure
inconsistent with the WTO obligation. Although the Appellate Body still found that the
U.S. shrimp embargo was not justified under GATT Article XX, the decision was not on
ground that the U.S. sea turtle law itself was not inconsistent with GATT. Rather, the
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ruling was on ground that the application of the law constituted “arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination” between WTO members (WTO, 1998). The WTO Appellate
Body pointed to a 1996 regional agreement reached at the U.S. initiation, namely the
Inter-American Convention on Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, as evidence
of the feasibility of such an approach (WTO, 1998; Berger, 1999). Here, the Appellate
Body again advanced the standing of multilateral environmental treaties (Zhang, 2004;
Zhang and Assunção, 2004). Thus, it follows that this trade dispute under the WTO may
have been interpreted as a clear preference for actions taken pursuant to multilateral
agreements and/or negotiated through international cooperative arrangements, such as the
Kyoto Protocol and its successor. However, this interpretation should be with great caution,
because there is no doctrine of stare decisis (namely, “to stand by things decided”) in the
WTO; the GATT/WTO panels are not bound by previous panel decisions (Zhang and
Assunção, 2004).
Moreover, the WTO Shrimp-Turtle dispute settlement has a bearing on the ongoing
discussion on the “comparability” of climate actions in a post-2012 climate change
regime. The Appellate Body found that when the U.S. shifted its standard from requiring
measures essentially the same as the U.S. measures to “the adoption of a program
comparable in effectiveness”, this new standard would comply with the WTO disciplines
(WTO, 2001, paragraph 144). Some may view that this case opens the door for U.S.
climate legislation that bases trade measures on an evaluation of the comparability of
climate actions taken by other trading countries (Werksman and Houser, 2008).
Comparable action can be interpreted as meaning action comparable in effect as the
“comparable in effectiveness” in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute. It can also be interpreted as
meaning “the comparability of efforts”. The Bali Action Plan (BAP) adopts the latter
interpretation, using the terms comparable as a means of ensuring that developed
countries undertake commitments comparable to each other. But the BAP does not
provide a clear definition. In the next section, we will discuss why there is a clear need to
define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use
of unilateral trade measures at the international level.

5. What can be taken from the MP and the findings of WTO Appellate Body in the
Shrimp-Turtle dispute?
The lesson from the MP suggests that trade measures can be incorporated in MEAs and
work effectively in practice only if they are accompanied with effective financial and
technology transfer mechanisms. However, just because the MP successfully uses trade
measures to prompt broad participation and help compliance and enforcement does not
necessarily mean that there is a potential for a post-2012 climate regime to do the same.
So we need to be very careful in transplanting the MP experience into the UNFCCC
context. Indeed, given that the scope of economic activities affected by a climate regime
is several orders of magnitude larger than those covered by the MP, it is unlikely for
industrialized countries to bear all the incremental costs of climate mitigation and
adaptation in developing countries as they do in the MP case. Developing countries have
well recognized this reality and are not expected for their costs to be fully borne by
industrialized countries. However, if the combined pledged funding from the funds under
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the Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and from its financial mechanism is
significantly far from the anticipated climate mitigation and adaptation needs from
developing countries as it has been the case, it is safe to say that developing country
parties are unlikely to agree to the inclusion of trade-related measures against them in a
post-2012 climate regime in the first place.
However, as part of the evolving climate regime, trade-related measures should, at the
very least, be contemplated for a set of industrialized countries (Annex I or II countries).
It should be specified how these measures will apply to non-complying parties within this
group and when and how unilateral trade measures can be used against countries outside
the group. On the one hand, current articles on climate-trade linkages under the UNFCCC
and its Kyoto Protocol are too general to hardly be of practical use. On the other hand,
the BAP calls for “comparability of efforts” towards climate mitigation actions only
among industrialized countries. However, lack of the clearly defined notion on what is
comparable has led to diverse interpretations of the concept of comparability. Moreover,
there is no equivalent language in the BAP to ensure that developing country actions,
whatever might be agreed at Copenhagen, that must also be comparable to those of
developed countries. So, some industrialized countries have extended the scope of its
application beyond industrialized countries themselves, attempting to impose unilateral
trade measures against other trading partners to address its competitiveness concerns.
Such lack of the common understanding will lead one country to define whether other
countries have made comparative efforts to its own. This can hardly be objective, and in
turn leads one country to misuse unilateral trade measures against other trading partners
to address its competitiveness concerns. Therefore, there is a clear need to define
comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of
unilateral trade measures at the international level, taking into account differences in their
national circumstances, such as current level of development, per capita GDP, current
and historical emissions, emission intensity, and per capita emissions. If well defined,
that will provide some reference to WTO panels in examining cases related to
comparability issues.
As a hypothetical example, assume that a country imposes unilateral trade measures
against its trading partners on the comparability ground but does so without following the
internationally agreed notion. Its trading partners might choose to challenge that country
before WTO. A case like this is likely, given that both the top Chinese official in charge
of climate issue and the Brazilian lead climate ambassador consider the WTO as the
proper forum when developing countries are required to purchase allowances in the
proposed U.S. cap-and-trade regime (Samuelsohn, 2007). This indicates that leading
developing countries appear to be comfortable with WTO rules and institutions defending
their interests in any dispute that may arise over unilateral trade measures. This is
reinforced in the Political Declaration of the Leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and
South Africa in Sapporo, Japan, July 8, 2008 that “in the negotiations under the Bali
Road Map, we urge the international community to focus on the core climate change
issues rather than inappropriate issues like competitiveness and trade protection measures
which are being dealt with in other forums”. However, the point is that if a case like this
really happens before a WTO panel, that panel would likely look to the UNFCCC for
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guidance on an appropriate standard for the comparability of climate to assess whether
that country has followed the international standard when determining comparability.
Otherwise, that WTO panel will have no choice but to fall back on the aforementioned
Shrimp-Turtle jurisprudence, and would be influenced by the fear of the political fall out
from overturning U.S. unilateral trade measures in its domestic climate legislation. If the
U.S. measures were allowed to stand, that would undermine the UNFCCC’s legitimacy in
setting and distributing climate commitments between its parties (Werksman and Houser,
2008).

6. How far can developing country commitments go in an immediate post-2012
climate regime?4
The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and public pressure on China had put
great pressure on China to take on some kind of commitments. Under these
circumstances and in anticipation that the U.S. would take on more stringent
commitments subsequent to the first compliance period (namely, far below its 1990 level),
I envisioned a decade ago the following six proposals that could be put on the table as
China’s plausible negotiation position, which is described in ascending order of stringency
(Zhang, 2000).5
“First, China could regard its active participation in CDM as ‘meaningful participation’.
Second, just as Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I countries to ‘have
made demonstrable progress’ in achieving their commitments by 2005, China could
commit to demonstrable efforts towards slowing its greenhouse gas emissions growth at
some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Securing the undefined
‘demonstrable progress’ regarding China’s efforts is the best option that China should
fight for at the international climate change negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires.
Third, if the above commitment is not considered ‘meaningful’, China could make
voluntary commitments to specific policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas
emissions at some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Policies and
measures might need to be developed to explicitly demonstrate whether or not China has
made adequate efforts. Such policies and measures might include abolishing energy
subsidies, improving the efficiency of energy use, promoting renewable energies, and
increasing the R&D spending on developing environmentally sound coal technologies.
Fourth, China could make a voluntary commitment to total energy consumption or total
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around or beyond 2020. In my
view, carbon intensity of the economy is preferred to energy intensity of the economy
4

This section draws heavily on Zhang (2000, 2008b and 2009a).
Zhang (2000) was originally prepared for the United Nations Development Programme
in 1998. When the draft of that paper was ready, the Washington DC-based Resources for
the Future made a press release titled “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse
Gas Emissions?”, September 15, 1998.
5
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(i.e., total energy consumption per unit of GDP), because all the efforts towards shifting
away from high-carbon energy are awarded by the former…
The fifth option would be for China to voluntarily commit to an emissions cap on a
particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. Taking on such a commitment,
although already burdensome for China, could raise the concern about the carbon leakage
from the sector to those sectors whose emissions are not capped.
This leads to the final option that China could offer: a combination of a targeted carbon
intensity level with an emissions cap on a particular sector at some point around or
beyond 2020. This is the bottom line: China cannot afford to go beyond it until its per
capita income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries.”
At that time, it looked like China would be pressured to take on commitments at a much
earlier date than what China wished. This situation changed once the U.S. withdrew from
the Kyoto Protocol. A decade later, we see that the ideas of commitments based on
carbon intensity and sectoral approaches, which were discussed in the academic literature
ten years ago, are formally incorporated into the Bali roadmap. This roadmap, which was
agreed to at the UNFCCC Conference of Parties meeting in December 2007, sets out the
course for developing post-2012 commitments, with a clear deadline for conclusion by
2009. This is a very positive development, and clearly indicates the policy relevance of
the once-sound-theoretical ideas. However, there is great doubt that developing countries
will go beyond the aforementioned third option between 2013 and 2020 for several
reasons.
First, given the very short timeframe to conclude the negotiations, in all likelihood, it
would be impossible to reach the necessary agreement on the rules, countries and sectors
covered and the levels of ambitions for developing countries, especially due to the
amount of the data that would be required. As it has been indicated by the Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Summit in September 2007, setting a carbon
intensity target, even if it is not binding, is not that easy. Australia, the host country,
proposed that all 21 APEC economies, regardless of whether they are developed and
developing economies, agree to reduce energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, but in
the end the leaders only agreed to work towards achieving an APEC-wide (emphasis
added) aspirational goal in energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, relative to 2005
levels. This should not come as a surprise because energy use per unit of GDP, a key
indicator of patterns of energy use, is still high in many developing Asian countries, and
even increased in countries such as Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korean and
Thailand between 1990 and 2004. Indonesia and Pakistan consumed almost the same
amount of energy per unit of GDP as they were in 1990 (Figure 1). Even the rate of
energy efficiency improvement in IEA countries has been less than 1% per year since
1990 – much lower than in the previous decades.
Second, it is inconceivable that developing countries would ever go beyond the
aforementioned third option between 2013 and 2020 without an effective financial
mechanism. Market instruments like CDM, as useful as it may be, must be complemented
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with traditional fund solutions that provide a stable source of funding. However, the
pledged funding from the funds under the Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and
from its financial mechanism are far from the anticipated needs from developing
countries. Unless this funding situation changes significantly, which is most unlikely to
happen, developing countries cannot afford to make commitments beyond the third
option above-envisioned a decade ago.
2000
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Figure 1. Energy use per unit of GDP in the selected Asia Pacific countries, 1990-2004
(Tons of oil equivalent/million 2000 US$).
Source: Zhang (2008a).
Third, the U.S. factor will continue to play a role in affecting developing country’s
willingness to take on commitments and the ambition of that commitments. The U.S.
House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
that would cut U.S. carbon emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020 by a vote of 219212 on June 26, 2009. The debate would now move to the U.S. Senate that is expected to
write its own version of a climate change bill, but its fate is uncertain this year. Even if
the Senate’s bill had set the same emission target as the House’s bill, U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions in 2020 would be still above their 1990 level, given the fact that U.S. GHG
emissions were 16.8% higher in 2005 than that in 1990 (EIA, 2007), and not all emission
sources are capped under the Act. From a U.S. perspective, that emission reduction
would appear quite ambitious and require serious actions and investment, but is still far
short of a 7% reduction of the U.S. GHG emissions during the period 2008-2012 required
by the Kyoto Protocol and 25-40% by 2020 suggested by the IPCC and demanded by
developing countries. In anticipation that the U.S. would take on the more stringent
commitments subsequent to the first compliance period (namely, far below its 1990 level),
I envisioned a decade ago that developing countries may go beyond the aforementioned
12
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third option. However, the U.S. emissions in 2020 are at best kept at their 1990 level.
This is far from the point where it is likely that developing country would do that.

7. Encouraging developing countries to do more: carrots, sticks or both?
Understandably, the U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see developing
countries, in particular large developing economies, go beyond that because of concerns
about their own competitiveness and growing greenhouse gas emissions in developing
countries. They are considering unilateral trade measures to “induce” developing
countries to do so. WTO members have rights to do that because they are free to
unilaterally decide what measures to take and under what conditions. But once they have
made such a choice, then and only then the WTO rules apply. For example, a variety of
measures have been put forward for the U.S. legislators to consider, falling into the three
broad categories: border adjustment measures, performance standards and carbon market
design (Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality of the U.S. House of Representatives,
2008). To date, there is a considerable disagreement as to what measures would be most
likely to pass muster under the WTO. Therefore, from the perspective of WTO
consistency, industrialized countries need to focus on carrots, supported by sticks (e.g.,
border adjustment measures and similar trade-related measures, or conditions on access
to carbon markets), as a means of encouraging developing countries to do more
domestically than what are internationally agreed upon. The Montreal Protocol clearly
demonstrates that an approach of a carrots (financial assistance and technology transfer)
assisted with sticks (trade restrictions) approach works effectively in achieving its
legitimate environmental objective.
However, measures as proposed in the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008
hold out more sticks than carrots to developing countries. A proposal by the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and American Electric Power (AEP) would
have required importers to obtain emission allowances to cover the carbon content of
certain products from countries that do not take climate actions comparable to that of the
U.S. (Morris and Hill, 2007). The original version of the bill had already incorporated
this mechanism, threatening to punish energy-intensive imports from developing
countries by requiring importers to obtain emission allowance, but only if they had not
taken comparable actions by 2020, eight years after the effective start date of a U.S. capand-trade regime begins. It was argued that the inclusion of trade provisions would give
the U.S. additional diplomatic leverage to negotiate multilaterally and bilaterally with
other countries on comparable climate actions. Should such negotiations not succeed,
such trade provisions would provide a means of leveling the carbon playing field between
American energy-intensive manufacturers and their competitors in countries not taking
comparable climate actions. Not only would the bill have imposed an import allowance
purchase requirement too quickly, it would have also dramatically expanded the scope of
punishment: almost any manufactured product would potentially have qualified. If
strictly implemented, such a provision would pose an insurmountable hurdle for
developing countries (The Economist, 2008).
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It should be emphasized that the aim of including trade provisions is to facilitate
negotiations while keeping open the possibility of invoking trade measures as a last resort.
The latest version of the Lieberman-Warner bill has brought the deadline forward to 2014
to gain business and union backing.6 The inclusion of trade provisions might be
considered the “price” of passage for any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas
emissions. Put another way, it is likely that no climate legislation can move through U.S.
Congress without dealing with the issue of trade provisions. An important issue on the
table is the length of the grace period to be granted to developing countries. While many
factors need to be taken into consideration here (Haverkamp, 2008), further bringing
forward the imposition of allowance requirements to imports is rather unrealistic, given
the already very short grace period ending 2019 in its original version. It should be
noticed that the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer grants
developing countries a grace period of 10 years (Zhang, 2000). Given that the scope of
economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of magnitude larger
than those covered by the Montreal Protocol, if legislation incorporates border adjustment
measures (put the issue of their WTO consistency aside), in my view, they should not be
invoked at least 10 years after mandatory U.S. emission targets take effect.
Moreover, unrealistically shortening the grace period granted before resorting to the trade
provisions would increase uncertainty of whether the measure would withstand a
challenge by U.S. trading partners before the WTO. As the ruling in the Shrimp-Turtle
dispute indicates, for a trade measure to be considered WTO-consistent, a period of goodfaith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned is needed before
imposing such trade measures. Put another way, trade provisions should be preceded by
major efforts to negotiate with partners within a reasonable timeframe. Furthermore,
developing countries need reasonable time to develop and operate national climate
policies and measures. Take the establishment of an emissions trading scheme as a case
in point. Even for the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading Program, the entire process from the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency beginning to compile the data for its allocation
database in 1989 to publishing its final allowance allocations in March 2003 took almost
four years. For the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the entire process
took almost two years from the EU publishing the Directive establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading on 23 July 2003 to it approving the last
national allocation plan for Greece on 20 June 2005. For developing countries with very
weak environmental institutions and that do not have dependable data on emissions, fuel
uses and outputs for installations, this allocation process is expected to take much longer
than what experienced in the U.S. and the EU (Zhang, 2007b).
In the case of a WTO dispute, the question will arise whether there are any alternatives to
trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not
inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions. In the GATT Thai
cigarette dispute, the Dispute Settlement Panel concluded that Thailand had legitimate
6

This is in line with the IBEW/AEP proposal, which requires U.S. importers to submit
allowances to cover the emissions produced during the manufacturing of those goods two
years after U.S. starts its trade-and-cap program (McBroom, 2008).
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concerns with health but it had measures available to it other than a trade ban that would
be consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (e.g. bans on advertising)
(GATT, 1990). Indeed, there are alternatives to resorting to trade provisions to protect the
U.S. trade-sensitive, energy-intensive industries during a period when the U.S. is taking
good-faith efforts to negotiate with trading partners on comparable actions. One way to
address competitiveness concerns is to initially allocate free emission allowances to those
sectors vulnerable to global competition, either totally or partially.7 Bovenberg and
Goulder (2002) found that giving out about 13% of the allowances to fossil fuel suppliers
freely instead of auctioning in an emissions trading scheme in the U.S. would be
sufficient to prevent their profits with the emissions constraints from falling in
comparison with those without the emissions constraints.
There is no disagreement that the allocation of permits to emissions sources is a
politically contentious issue. Grandfathering, at least partially grandfathering, helps these
well-organized, politically highly-mobilized industries or sectors to save considerable
expenditures and thus increases the political acceptability of an emissions trading scheme,
although it leads to a higher economic cost than a policy where the allowances are fully
auctioned.8 That explains why the sponsors of the American Clean Energy and Security
Act of 2009 had to make a compromise amending it to auction only 15% of the emission
permits instead of the initial proposal for auctioning all the emission permits in a
proposed cap-and-trade regime in order for it to pass the U.S. House of Representatives
Energy and Commerce Committee in May 2009. However, it should be pointed out that
although grandfathering is thought of as giving implicit subsidies to these sectors,
grandfathering is less trade-distorted than the exemptions from carbon taxes (Zhang,
1998 and 1999), which means that partially grandfathering is even less trade-distorted
than the exemptions from carbon taxes. To understand their difference, it is important to
bear in mind that grandfathering itself also implies an opportunity cost for firms receiving
permits: what matters here is not how firms get your permits, but what firms can sell
them for - that is what determines opportunity cost. Thus, even if permits are awarded
gratis, firms will value them at their market price. Accordingly, the prices of energy will
7

To be consistent with the WTO provisions, foreign producers could arguably demand
the same proportion of free allowances as U.S. domestic producers in case they are
subject to border adjustments.
8
In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortionary taxes, if allowances are
auctioned, the revenues generated can then be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary
taxes, thus generating overall efficiency gains. Parry et al. (1999), for example, show that
the costs of reducing U.S. carbon emissions by 10% in a second-best setting with preexisting labor taxes are five times more costly under a grandfathered carbon permits case
than under an auctioned case. This is because the policy where the permits are auctioned
raises revenues for the government that can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary
taxes. By contrast, in the former case, no revenue-recycling effect occurs, since no
revenues are raised for the government. However, the policy produces the same taxinteraction effect as under the latter case, which tends to reduce employment and
investment and thus exacerbates the distortionary effects of pre-existing taxes (Zhang,
1999).
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adjust to reflect the increased scarcity of fossil fuels. This means that regardless of
whether emissions permits are given out freely or are auctioned by the government, the
effects on energy prices are expected to be the same, although the initial ownership of
emissions permits differs among different allocation methods. As a result, relative prices
of products will not be distorted relative to their pre-existing levels and switching of
demands towards products of those firms whose permits are awarded gratis (the so-called
substitution effect) will not be induced by grandfathering. This makes grandfathering
different from the exemptions from carbon taxes. In the latter case, there exist
substitution effects (Zhang, 1998 and 1999). For example, the Commission of the
European Communities (CEC) proposal for a mixed carbon and energy tax9 provides for
exemptions for the six energy-intensive industries (i.e., iron and steel, non-ferrous metals,
chemicals, cement, glass, and pulp and paper) from coverage of the CEC tax on grounds
of competitiveness. This not only reduces the effectiveness of the CEC tax in achieving
its objective of reducing CO2 emissions, but also makes the industries, which are exempt
from paying the CEC tax, improve their competitive position in relation to those
industries which are not. Therefore, there will be some switching of demand towards the
products of these energy-intensive industries, which is precisely the reaction that such a
tax should avoid (Zhang, 1997).
Moreover, to pass WTO scrutiny of trade provisions, the U.S. is likely to make reference
to the health and environmental exceptions provided under GATT Article XX. This
Article itself is the exceptions that authorize governments to employ otherwise GATTillegal measures when such measures are necessary to deal with certain enumerated
public policy problems. The GATT panel in Tuna/Dolphin II concluded that Article XX
does not preclude governments from pursuing environmental concerns outside their
national territory, but such extra-jurisdictional application of domestic laws would be
permitted only if aimed primarily (emphasis added) at having a conservation or
protection effect (GATT, 1994; Zhang, 1998). The capacity of the planet’s atmosphere to
absorb greenhouse gas emissions without adverse impacts is an ‘exhaustible natural
resource’. Thus, if countries take measures on their own including extra-jurisdictional
application primarily to prevent the depletion of this ‘exhaustible natural resource’, such
measures will have a good justification under GATT Article XX. Along this reasoning, if
the main objective of trade provisions is to protect the environment by requiring other
countries to take actions comparable to that of the U.S., then mandating importers to
purchase allowances from the designated special international reserve allowance pool to
cover the carbon emissions associated with the manufacture of that product is debatable.
To increase the prospects for a successful WTO defense, I think that trade provisions can
refer to the designated special international reserve allowance pool, but may not do
9

As part of its comprehensive strategy to control CO2 emissions and increase energy
efficiency, a carbon/energy tax has been proposed by the CEC. The CEC proposal is that
member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$ 3 per barrel oil equivalent in 1993,
rising in real terms by US$ 1 a year to US$ 10 per barrel in 2000. After the year 2000 the
tax rate will remain at US$ 10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates are allocated across
fuels, with 50% based on carbon content and 50% on energy content (Zhang, 1997).
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without adding “or equivalent”. This will allow importers to submit equivalent emission
reduction units that are not necessarily allowances but are recognized by international
treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products.
Besides the issue of WTO consistency, there will be methodological challenges in
implementing trade provisions, although such practical implementation issues are
secondary concerns. Identifying the appropriate carbon contents embodied in traded
products will present formidable technical difficulties, given the wide range of technologies
in use around the world and very different energy resource endowments and consumption
patterns among countries. In the absence of any information regarding the carbon content
of the products from exporting countries, importing countries, the U.S. in this case, could
adopt either of the two approaches to overcoming information challenge in practical
implementation. One is to prescribe the tax rates for the imported product based on U.S.
domestically predominant method of production for a like product, which sets the average
embedded carbon content of a particular product (Zhang, 1998; Zhang and Assunção,
2004). This practice is by no means without foundation. For example, the U.S. Secretary
of the Treasury has adopted the approach in the tax on imported toxic chemicals under
the Superfund Tax (GATT, 1987; Zhang, 1998). Alternative is to set the best available
technology (BAT) as the reference technology level and then use the average embedded
carbon content of a particular product produced with the BAT in applying BTA (Ismer
and Neuhoff, 2007). Generally speaking, developing countries will bear a lower cost
based on either of the approaches than using the nation-wide average carbon content of
imported products for the country of origin, given that less energy-efficient technologies in
developing countries produce products of higher embedded carbon contends than those like
products produced by more energy-efficient technologies in the U.S. However, to be more
defensible, either of the approaches should allow foreign producers to challenge the
carbon contents applied to their products to ensure that they will not pay for more than
they have actually emitted.

8. Conclusions
Governments are taking great efforts to forge an agreement on comparable climate
actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations. Aimed at leveling the carbon playing field,
the inclusion of trade-related provisions is considered useful by some in both facilitating
the adoption of such an agreement and effectively implementing it, once reached.
To gain some guidance on the scope of trade provisions in a post-2012 climate change
regime, this paper first describes the Montreal Protocol in which such trade provisions
have been included. The lesson from the Montreal Protocol suggests that trade measures
can be incorporated in multilateral environmental agreements and work effectively in
practice only if they are accompanied with effective finance and technology transfer
mechanisms. This lesson, combined with the fact the combined pledged funding from the
funds under the Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and from its financial
mechanism is far from the anticipated climate mitigation and adaptation needs of
developing countries, suggests that developing country parties are unlikely to agree the
inclusion of trade-related measures against them in a post-2012 climate regime.
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In the meantime, the paper argues that trade-related measures should, at the very least, be
contemplated for a set of industrialized countries (Annex I or II countries) as part of the
evolving climate regime at least on two grounds. First, the Shrimp-Turtle dispute under
the WTO may have been interpreted as a clear preference for actions taken pursuant to
multilateral agreements and/or negotiated through international cooperative arrangements.
Second, there is a clear need to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and
adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level. The
Bali Action Plan calls for “comparability of efforts” towards climate mitigation actions
only among industrialized countries. However, some industrialized countries, if not all,
are considering the term “comparable” as the standard by which to assess the efforts
made by all their trading partners in order to decide on whether to impose unilateral trade
measures on them. This is not hypothetical. Rather, it is very real as the LiebermanWarner bill in the U.S. Senate demonstrated. While that bill died on the floor of the
Senate, this is by no means the end of the prospect for border adjustment type of
unilateral trade measures provision, given that the inclusion of such trade provisions
might be considered the “price” for passing any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse
gas emissions. In addition to methodological challenges in implementing the LiebermanWarner type of border adjustment provision, the paper argues that that type of border
adjustment provision is likely to face a WTO-consistency challenge. To increase the
prospects for a successful WTO defense, there should be a period of good-faith efforts to
reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures.
Put another way, trade provisions should be preceded by major efforts to negotiate with
partners within a reasonable timeframe. As the WTO panel’s findings of the GATT Thai
cigarette dispute indicate, the WTO consistency also requires considering alternatives to
trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not
inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions. Moreover, the paper
suggests that trade provisions can refer to the designated special international reserve
allowance pool, but may not do without adding “or equivalent”. This will allow importers
to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties
to cover the carbon contents of imported products.
It should be emphasized that the Lieberman-Warner type of border adjustment provision
holds out more sticks than carrots to developing countries. If the U.S. and other
industrialized countries really want to persuade developing countries to do more to
combat climate change, they should first reflect why developing countries are unwilling
to and cannot afford to go beyond the aforementioned third option in the first place. That
will require industrialized countries to seriously consider developing countries’ legitimate
demand that industrialized countries need to demonstrate that they have taken the lead in
reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions, provide significant funding to support
developing country’s climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts and to transfer
low- or zero-carbon emission technologies at an affordable price to developing countries.
Industrialized countries need to provide positive incentives to encourage developing
countries to do more. Carrots should serve as the main means. Sticks can be incorporated,
but only if they are credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement to push
developing countries to take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than would
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otherwise have been the case. At a time when the world community is starting to
negotiate a post-2012 climate regime, unrealistic border adjustment measures as
exemplified in the Lieberman-Warner bill are counterproductive to help to reach such an
agreement on comparable climate actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations.
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